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INTRODUCTION 
In a much-cited Harvard Law Review article twenty-three 
years ago, Judge Pierre N. Leval criticized the state of fair use 
doctrine as lacking “a set of governing principles or values.”1 
Judges do not share a consensus on the meaning of 
fair use.  Earlier decisions provide little basis for 
predicting later ones.  Reversals and divided courts 
are commonplace.  The opinions reflect widely 
differing notions of the meaning of fair use.  
Decisions are not governed by consistent principles, 
but seem rather to result from intuitive reactions to 
individual fact patterns.2 
Judge Leval introduced “transformativeness,” a concept not 
explicitly mentioned in the Copyright Act, as a way to assess the 
first statutory fair use factor—“the purpose and character of the 
use.”3  Rather than examine, as the statute suggests, whether the 
use “is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational 
                                                                                                             
1 Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1105 (1990). 
2 Id. at 1106–07. 
3 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2012). 
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purposes,” courts should assess, as the test was later adopted by the 
Supreme Court, “whether and to what extent the new [allegedly 
infringing] work is ‘transformative’” of the copied work.4  To be 
transformative, “[t]he use must be productive and must employ the 
quoted matter in a different manner or for a different purpose from 
the original.”  If the new work does not “merely ‘supersede the 
objects’ of the original,” but instead “adds value to the original—if 
the quoted matter is used as raw material, transformed in the 
creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and 
understandings—this is the very type of activity that the fair use 
doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of society.”5 
Transformative use has, by steady accretion, come to dominate 
fair use case law, but has failed to provide the hoped-for consistent 
governing principles.  It has, to the contrary, led courts to highly 
idiosyncratic results.  Nowhere is this more apparent than in the 
way the Second Circuit— considered the leading copyright court—
has handled the fair use issues of appropriation art. 
Cariou v. Prince,6 the third appropriation art case decided by an 
appellate court (all in the Second Circuit), was eagerly anticipated by 
the art world for its potential impact on the future of appropriation 
art and the rights of photographers, and by copyright practitioners 
interested in the direction of the fair use doctrine.  It should 
disappoint all those constituencies, though for different reasons.  
The plaintiff photographer lost as a matter of law on twenty-five of 
the thirty artworks.7  The decision to remand five works of art was 
consistent with Prince’s appellate argument for considering each 
work separately rather than the collection as a whole,8 but it may 
still cause considerable chagrin to the champions of appropriation 
art who argue that context alone transforms and therefore all thirty 
works were equally transformative and fair use. 
                                                                                                             
4 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
5 Leval, supra note 1, at 1111. 
6 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 618 (2013).  The opinion was 
published a little more than eleven months after it was argued. 
7 Id. at 707. 
8 Id. at 710–11. 
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Of greatest concern to those who practice or follow copyright 
law is the extent to which transformativeness has become virtually 
a one-factor test by over-powering factors that would otherwise 
weigh against fair use, the extent to which that concept has become 
a euphemism for aesthetic and other value judgments that judges 
claim to eschew, and the failure of the appellate decision to explain 
why some works were more transformative than others.  Cariou v. 
Prince confirms what academics have long noted and practitioners 
recognized: that the ascendancy of transformative use analysis has 
coincided with and become a justification for a judicial tilt toward 
fair use, but has failed to bring greater clarity and predictability to 
fair use decisions and has instead become an empty buzz-word. 
This Article will briefly summarize the ascendancy of 
transformativeness to provide a context for a review of the three 
appropriation art cases—two against Jeff Koons and one against 
Richard Prince.  It will show the diverse and even inconsistent 
legal analyses the courts have used, that transformativeness is 
inadequate to explain the results, and, ultimately, that, as leading 
copyright academics have noted, transformativeness has decayed 
into a conclusory label that substitutes for, rather than enhances, 
thoughtful analysis.9  As such, it does not make prediction of legal 
outcomes any easier than the statutorily based multi-factor 
balancing test it is supposed to be a part of, but has in practice 
often dominated or replaced.  I ultimately conclude that if 
transformative use is to retain any utility in the overall fair use 
analysis, it must return to a more modest role as part of the first 
fair use factor to be weighed in more traditional fashion with or 
against, without effectively swamping, the other factors. 
Given the correlation—and likely causal relation—between the 
rise of transformativeness and an increase in favorable fair use 
determinations, returning to a more traditional fair use multi-factor 
balancing test would likely tilt decisions in a pro-copyright-owner 
direction.  It would most likely not, however, be a sharp tilt 
                                                                                                             
9 See 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[A][1] 
[b] (2012). 
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because of the trend favoring fair use in public and judicial 
attitudes. 
Furthermore, the impact of that doctrinal shift would not be as 
large as it might have been in the past because it would be 
mitigated by the demise of the automatic remedy of injunctions in 
copyright infringement that was started by the Supreme Court 
seven years ago in the eBay case,10 which the Second Circuit 
flagged in its remand of five of the works at issue in Cariou v. 
Prince.11  Without routine injunctions against copyright 
infringements, a judgment that something is not a fair use will not 
necessarily or likely mean that the secondary work will be 
suppressed, but will instead mean that the appropriator (intended as 
a neutral term, not a moral judgment) will have to pay for the 
reasonable value of what has been taken.12 
I. HOW TRANSFORMATIVENESS BECAME  
THE HEART AND SOUL OF FAIR USE 
Fair use in copyright began as a common law concept whose 
basic precepts were not codified into statute until the Copyright 
Act of 1976.13  It has since been considered primarily, if not 
exclusively, a matter of statute.14  Section 107 of the Copyright Act 
                                                                                                             
10 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
11 Cariou, 714 F.3d at 712 n.5. 
12 This may have been what the Second Circuit was implicitly encouraging by clearing 
twenty-five works and remanding five in Cariou v. Prince. See infra text accompanying 
notes 241–42 and 280–81. 
13 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).  For a succinct summary of the process and of Professor 
Nimmer’s attempt to “include only a spare recognition of the fair use defense” rather than 
the four-factor test that ultimately prevailed, see Richard Dannay, Factorless Fair Use? 
Was Melville Nimmer Right?, 60 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 127, 128–32 (2013). 
14 There is a First Amendment basis for fair use because it is a matter of protecting 
freedom of expression.  The courts have held, however, that the statutory fair use test, 
together with other copyright doctrines, is adequate to protect First Amendment rights.  
See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219, 221 (2003) (The “traditional contours of 
copyright protection,” that is, the “idea/expression dichotomy” and the “fair use” defense, 
moreover, serve as “built-in First Amendment accommodations.” (citing Harper & Row 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556, 560 (1985))); Roy Export Co. v. 
CBS, Inc., 672 F.2d 1095, 1099 (2d Cir. 1982) (“No circuit that has considered the 
question . . . has ever held that the First Amendment provides a privilege in the copyright 
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of 1976 requires a court to consider four factors in determining 
whether use of a copyrighted work is fair and therefore not 
infringement: 
(1)  the purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 
nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2)   the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3)  the amount and substantiality of the portion 
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; 
and 
(4)  the effect of the use upon the potential market 
for or value of the copyrighted work.15 
The first factor initially turned, as the statute would indicate, on 
whether a use was for a commercial or nonprofit purpose.  In a 
1984 case on home video recording of television programs (the 
“Sony” case), the Supreme Court reasoned that “every commercial 
use of copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation 
of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the 
copyright.”16 
Ten years later when dealing with a parody song recorded for 
profit in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,17 the Court 
effectively discarded that presumption in the guise of limiting Sony 
to its facts.18  It held that no such presumption could have been 
intended in the statute because “nearly all of the illustrative uses 
listed in the preamble paragraph of § 107, including news 
                                                                                                             
field distinct from the accommodation embodied in the ‘fair use’ doctrine.”).  Professor 
Netanel notes and criticizes this view. See Neil W. Netanel, Locating Copyright Within 
the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2001) (“[C]ourts have almost never 
imposed First Amendment limitations on copyright, and most have summarily rejected 
copyright infringement free speech defenses.  In almost every instance, courts have 
assumed that First Amendment values are fully and adequately protected by limitations 
on copyright owner rights within copyright doctrine itself.”). 
15 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
16 Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984). 
17 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
18 Id. at 584–85, 591. 
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reporting, comment, criticism, teaching, scholarship, and 
research . . . ‘are generally conducted for profit.’”19 
The Court explained that Sony’s statement that commercial use 
was “presumptively” unfair had been meant to apply to that case’s 
specific context of wholesale duplication.20  Sony involved 
potential vicarious liability of distributors of video tape recorders 
to “time-shift”—to record complete television shows and other 
material exhibited on television to view at some other time.21  As 
we will see, however, Campbell’s holding relevant to the specific 
issue of parody—the freedom to use large amounts of the original 
work that parody requires—was soon expanded beyond that 
limited context to all transformative uses.22 
There was even a time when the fourth factor was considered 
preeminent.  In Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises,23 the 
Supreme Court pronounced the fourth factor “undoubtedly the 
single most important element of fair use.  ‘Fair use, when 
properly applied, is limited to copying by others which does not 
materially impair the marketability of the work which is 
copied.’”24  That too was rejected by, or reinterpreted in light of, 
the ascendency of transformative use.  Campbell held that a parody 
could destroy the marketability of its target, just as a bad review 
                                                                                                             
19 Id. at 584 (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 
592 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)); see NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 
477–78 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584).  The statement is a bit of an 
exaggeration, since most people would not consider “comment, criticism, teaching, [and] 
scholarship” to be activities conducted for profit.  The distinction between doing 
something for which one is compensated (for example, scholarship and teaching) and 
doing it for profit may be subtle but nevertheless not difficult to understand.  It may be 
true that, as the Court quoted from Samuel Johnson, “‘[n]o man but a blockhead ever 
wrote, except for money.’”  Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584 (quoting 3 JAMES BOSWELL, THE 
LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON, 19 (G. Hill ed., 1934)).  It is probably also true, however, that 
only a blockhead would be motivated to become a writer or scholar by the thought of 
being well compensated for it. 
20 Id. at 591 (“[W]hat Sony said simply makes common sense: when a commercial use 
amounts to mere duplication of the entirety of an original, it clearly ‘supersede[s] the 
objects.’” (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841))). 
21 Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 421 (1984). 
22 See discussion infra Part VI.B. 
23 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
24 Id. at 566–67 (1985) (quoting 1 NIMMER, supra note 9, § 1.10[D]). 
328 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 24:321 
 
could attempt to do so, because “there is no [protectable] 
derivative market for criticism.”25 
Two years before Campbell, Judge Leval’s law review article 
argued for a different way to look at the first factor: whether the 
accused work was “transformative.”26  Considering “‘the purpose 
and character of the use’ raises the question of justification.  Does 
the use fulfill the objective of copyright law to stimulate creativity 
for public illumination?”27  “[T]he answer to the question of 
justification,” he argued, “turns primarily on whether, and to what 
extent, the challenged use is transformative.  The use must be 
productive and must employ the quoted matter in a different 
manner or for a different purpose from the original.”28 
The article and the Supreme Court’s approval of its advocacy 
of the transformativeness concept in analyzing parody several 
years later sent the law down a path different from the Supreme 
Court’s prior emphasis on commercial use as presumptively 
unfair.29  Although both the article and the case link the concept, 
without directly attributing it, to Folsom v. Marsh,30 an early 
American copyright opinion authored by Joseph Story (as Circuit 
Justice), neither the word “transformative” nor, I would argue, the 
concept, is used in that opinion.31 
                                                                                                             
25 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591–92 (1994). 
26 Leval, supra note 1, at 1111. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583–85, 590–92. 
30 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). 
31 In arguing “[t]he irrelevance of the morality of the secondary user’s conduct” to fair 
use, Judge Leval invokes the authority of Folsom v. Marsh: “There Justice Story 
emphasized not only the good faith and ‘meritorious labors’ of the defendants, but also 
the usefulness of their work. Finding no ‘bona fide abridgement’ (what I have described 
as a transformative use), Justice Story nonetheless concluded with ‘regret’ that good faith 
could not save the secondary work from being ‘deemed in law a piracy.’” Leval, supra 
note 1, at 1127.  I would not equate usefulness with transformativeness.  In Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose, the Supreme Court contrasted a transformative use with one that, “in Justice 
Story’s words, . . . merely ‘supersede[s] the objects’ of the original creation.” Campbell, 
510 U.S. at 579 (quoting Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 348).  There, Justice Story was discussing 
what ultimately became the fourth fair use factor and contrasting a summary or 
commentary on a work with producing a substitute for reading the work. See 17 U.S.C. 
§ 107(4) (2012). 
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More importantly, several limitations that Judge Leval would 
have put on the power of transformativeness were lost in 
subsequent doctrinal development.  Though he called the first 
factor “the soul of fair use,” Judge Leval considered it a necessary 
but not sufficient condition for finding fair use: “A finding of 
justification under this factor seems indispensable to a fair use 
defense.”32  Two years later in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, the 
Supreme Court agreed with the first part of Judge Leval’s 
statement by holding that “transformative works . . . lie at the heart 
of the fair use doctrine’s guarantee of breathing space within the 
confines of copyright.”33  Contrary to Judge Leval’s second 
statement, however, it held that transformativeness was not 
necessary to a fair use determination while hinting that it might be 
sufficient.34 
Although later decisions gave this factor power to diminish or 
completely override the significance of the other factors, Judge 
Leval did not believe that transformativeness led inexorably to a 
fair use determination: “The existence of any identifiable 
transformative objective does not, however, guarantee success in 
claiming fair use.  The transformative justification must overcome 
factors favoring the copyright owner.”35  Alluding to the third 
factor, he added that “the secondary user’s claim under the first 
factor is weakened to the extent that her takings exceed the 
asserted justification.  The justification will likely be outweighed if 
the takings are excessive and other factors favor the copyright 
owner.”36 
The emphasis on transformativeness has certainly engendered 
creativity on the part of copyright lawyers, if not on the part of 
artists.  Arguments that any given use is transformative have 
increasingly become strained, and the concept has come in some 
cases to simplistically overpower the other fair use factors rather 
than engage with them. 
                                                                                                             
32 Leval, supra note 1, at 1116. 
33 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
34 See id. (emphasis added). 
35 Leval, supra note 1, at 1111 (emphasis added). 
36 Id. at 1112. 
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As will be shown in Part II below, the concept of 
transformative use came to dominate the way in which 
appropriation art was judged—a doctrinal trend criticized by 
academics and treatise writers, as noted in Part III below, and the 
subject of snarky remarks by practitioners.  The increase in 
doctrinal power has corresponded with an increase in fair use 
determinations but also a decrease in explanatory power and 
coherence. 
II. PRIOR APPROPRIATION ART CASES 
A. Rogers v. Koons 
Rogers v. Koons, decided in 1992, involved a sculptural 
adaptation of a folksy photograph of a couple holding their eight 
new German shepherd puppies.37  Among its copyrightable 
elements were that Rogers “selected the light, the location, the 
bench on which the [human couple] are seated and the arrangement 
of the small dogs.  He also made creative judgments concerning 
technical matters with his camera and the use of natural light.”38 
Koons bought a postcard of that photograph, tore the copyright 
notice off—considered to show bad faith—and sent it to a studio 
with instructions to his artisans to copy it faithfully in a sculpture 
of polychromed wood, albeit with specified colors and (apparently 
though not mentioned in the opinion) some daisies strategically 
added.39  The Rogers photo and a photo of the Koons sculpture are 
shown on the next page: 
                                                                                                             
37 960 F.2d 301, 303 (2d Cir. 1992). 
38 Id. at 304. 
39 Id. at 305. 
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As a transformation from photo to sculpture, the Koons work 
would obviously be an infringing derivative work if not considered 
fair use.  The court noted that Koons “works in an art tradition 
dating back to the beginning of the twentieth century . . . [that] . . .  
defines its efforts as follows: when the artist finishes his work, the 
meaning of the original object has been extracted and an entirely 
new meaning set in its place.”40  This would now be interpreted as 
a defense of the work’s transformative use of the prior material, 
albeit in a conceptual sense without necessarily any physical 
change.  The changed context alone is transformative.  
Transformativeness was not, however, mentioned in the opinion. 
The Court of Appeals’ discussion of the first fair use factor 
focused solely on, and Koons was sharply criticized for, his 
commercial purpose and artistic arrogance in copying the photo as 
closely as possible: 
The copying was so deliberate as to suggest that 
defendants resolved so long as they were significant 
players in the art business, and the copies they 
produced bettered the price of the copied work by a 
thousand to one, their piracy of a less well-known 
artist’s work would escape being sullied by an 
accusation of plagiarism.41 
                                                                                                             
40 Id. at 304. 
41 Id. at 303.  The district and appellate courts expressed outrage at Koons’ 
disobedience of the lower court’s order to turn over his fourth and last copy of String of 
Puppies by spiriting it out of the country to a museum in Germany. Id. at 306, 313.  Since 
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The opinion acknowledged that “String of Puppies” was “a 
satirical critique of our materialistic society,” but said “it is 
difficult to discern any parody of the photograph ‘Puppies’ 
itself.”42  That is a peculiar holding in at least three respects: 
(1) The opinion at that point correctly distinguished parody 
from satire in the manner later done by the Supreme Court’s 
Campbell decision: parody comments on the specific work used, 
while satire uses “another’s copyrighted work to make a statement 
on some aspect of society at large.”43  At other points, however, 
the opinion completely muddies that distinction and uses the two 
concepts interchangeably: “Parody or satire, as we understand it, is 
when one artist, for comic effect or social commentary, closely 
imitates the style of another artist and in so doing creates a new art 
work that makes ridiculous the style and expression of the 
original.”44 
(2)  Having noted that the cases hold that “parody and satire are 
valued forms of criticism, encouraged because this sort of criticism 
itself fosters the creativity protected by the copyright law,” the 
court then again confused the two concepts and seemingly held 
that only parody is entitled to fair use protection.  For the copied 
work to be the object of the parody or ridicule, the copyist must 
conjure it up, which requires and “entitles its creator under the fair 
use doctrine to more extensive use of the copied work than is 
ordinarily allowed.”45 
                                                                                                             
that would have been preparatory to its potential destruction, getting the work out of the 
country was a desperate attempt to save the remaining unsold copy.  Impoundment and 
destruction of an infringement is explicitly authorized in the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 
503, and a remedy that did not appear unusual in Rogers v. Koons.  An indication of how 
times change is that this common remedy for common infringements seemed sufficiently 
shocking to the appellate court in Cariou v. Prince, at least as applied to artwork, that 
plaintiff’s counsel decided at oral argument not to defend the district court’s adoption of 
that remedy. See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d at 704 n.4. 
42 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992). 
43 Id.  “Parody needs to mimic an original to make its point, and so has some claim to 
use the creation of its victim’s (or collective victims’) imagination, whereas satire can 
stand on its own two feet and so requires justification for the very act of borrowing.” 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580–81 (1994). 
44 Rogers, 960 F.2d at 309–310. 
45 Id. at 310. 
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It is the rule in this Circuit that though the satire 
[actually parody] need not be only of the copied 
work and may, as appellants urge of “String of 
Puppies,” also be a parody [actually satire] of 
modern society, the copied work must be, at least in 
part, an object of the parody, otherwise there would 
be no need to conjure up the original work.46 
The problem is that the distinction is one of degree rather than 
dichotomy.  Commenting on and ridiculing the prior work (that is, 
parody) requires greater use, conjuring more, of the prior work.  
Satire, however, also has to conjure an original work even without 
commenting on it.  Satirical songs, for example, use a well-known 
melody with different, preferably funny but sometimes merely 
crude words.  Satire needs to conjure less of the original, but still 
needs to conjure some of it.47 
(3) In considering the appropriation to be satire rather than 
parody, and therefore lacking justification for the copying, the 
Second Circuit panel was too dismissive of the extent to which 
Koons commented on Rogers’ specific photo and too ready to 
restrict his justification for using it to his “acting within an artistic 
tradition of commenting upon the commonplace.”48  “String of 
Puppies” did seem, from the objective perspective later adopted by 
Cariou v. Prince, to comment on and ridicule Rogers’ work.  The 
mere fact that the sculpture was part of something called the 
“Banality Show” says that the earnest folksiness of Rogers’ photo 
was an object of derision.49   Moreover, the changes in the 
depiction of the humans in the sculpture—primarily the facial 
expressions and teeth—make them look far more like hicks than 
does the photograph. 
The court noted that the copied work need not be the exclusive 
focus of comment or ridicule—it need only be “at least in part” the 
object.50  Under that standard, Koons’ work should have been 
                                                                                                             
46 Id. 
47 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580–81. 
48 Rogers, 960 F.2d at 310. 
49 See id. at 304. 
50 Id. (citing MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 1981)). 
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considered both parody and satire, which, under subsequent 
doctrinal development, would deserve some respect and ability to 
copy Rogers’ work under the first fair use factor. 
Notwithstanding its confusion at some points of the difference 
between parody and satire, Rogers v. Koons ultimately showed 
great insight in teasing out why parody is justified in using more of 
the original than is satire.  It noted that the function of the rule that 
the prior work be “at least in part” an object of the parody 
is to insure that credit is given where credit is due.  
By requiring that the copied work be an object of 
the parody, we merely insist that the audience be 
aware that underlying the parody there is an original 
and separate expression, attributable to a different 
artist.  This awareness may come from the fact that 
the copied work is publicly known or because its 
existence is in some manner acknowledged by the 
parodist in connection with the parody.51 
That is, the parodied work must be well known for the parody to 
succeed. 
What perhaps kept “String of Puppies” from being parody as 
the court conceived that concept is not that it did not ridicule 
Rogers’ photograph but that the object of its ridicule was neither 
acknowledged nor well enough known to be recognized.52  This 
subtlety seems to have gotten lost in future cases. 
Koons was sued on two other works in his Banality Show, and 
lost both cases in district court opinions that followed the Second 
Circuit’s opinion in the Rogers case.53 
B. Blanch v. Koons 
                                                                                                             
51 Id. 
52 Id. (“By requiring that the copied work be an object of the parody, we merely insist 
that the audience be aware that underlying the parody there is an original and separate 
expression, attributable to a different artist.  This awareness may come from the fact that 
the copied work is publicly known or because its existence is in some manner 
acknowledged by the parodist in connection with the parody.”). 
53 See Campbell v. Koons, No. 91 Civ. 6055 (RO), 1993 WL 97381 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 
1993); United Feature Syndicate v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
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Sixteen years later, Koons was again sued for using a 
photographer’s work in one of a group of seven paintings called 
“Easyfun-Ethereal.”54  The appropriated photograph below on the 
left was a fashion photo by Andrea Blanch entitled “Silk Sandals 
by Gucci” that had appeared in Allure magazine.55  It shows a 
woman’s feet in a man’s lap in the first class section of an airplane 
and was intended to have an erotic content.56  The painting on the 
right below, called “Niagara,” “depicts four pairs of women’s feet 
and lower legs dangling prominently over images of confections—
a large chocolate fudge brownie topped with ice cream, a tray of 
donuts, and a tray of apple danish pastries—with a grassy field and 
Niagara Falls in the background.”57 
 
 
Having learned the lesson from the prior case, his lawyers 
drafted an affidavit for Koons explaining the need to copy the 
extracted portion of Blanch’s fashion photo the way he did, rather 
than to construct his own photograph of women’s feet in sandals.58  
The court quoted approvingly his stated justification for using the 
specific Blanch photo: 
                                                                                                             
54 Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 247 (2d Cir. 2006). 
55 Id. at 247–48. 
56 Id. at 248. 
57 Id. at 247. 
58 Id. at 255. 
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Although the legs in the Allure Magazine 
photograph [“Silk Sandals”] might seem prosaic, I 
considered them to be necessary for inclusion in my 
painting rather than legs I might have photographed 
myself.  The ubiquity of the photograph is central to 
my message.  The photograph is typical of a certain 
style of mass communication.  Images almost 
identical to them can be found in almost any glossy 
magazine, as well as in other media.  To me, the 
legs depicted in the Allure photograph are a fact in 
the world, something that everyone experiences 
constantly; they are not anyone’s legs in particular.  
By using a fragment of the Allure photograph in my 
painting, I thus comment upon the culture and 
attitudes promoted and embodied in Allure 
Magazine.  By using an existing image, I also 
ensure a certain authenticity or veracity that 
enhances my commentary—it is the difference 
between quoting and paraphrasing—and ensure that 
the viewer will understand what I am referring to.59 
To compare the appropriation of a photograph to quoting or 
paraphrasing in a written work is odd, because doing either in a 
written work would require citation.  In stating that “images almost 
identical to” Blanch’s photo are ubiquitous, a point “central to [his] 
message,” and that the photograph was “a fact in the world,” 
Koons was attacking the creativity of the photograph which, was at 
least an attempt to lessen its protection against fair use under the 
second factor, and could be construed as challenging any copyright 
protection at all.60  More importantly, his assertion of the 
importance of the fact that at least one of the photos was a real 
fashion magazine photo assumes without explanation that his 
audience would recognize those particular feet and shoes as 
coming from a fashion magazine.  Recognition or citation, which 
                                                                                                             
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
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should be the essence of parody as per Rogers v. Koons, was again 
missing.61 
Undoubtedly with the assistance of legal ghost-writing, Koons’ 
affidavit invoked the talismanic language of transformative use: “I 
transformed the meaning of these legs (as they appeared in the 
photograph) into the overall message and meaning of my painting.  
I thus suggest how commercial images like these intersect in our 
consumer culture and simultaneously promote appetites, like sex, 
and confine other desires, like playfulness.”62 
The case shows the remarkable extent to which the 
transformative use concept superseded the commercial/nonprofit 
dichotomy in determining which side the first factor favors.  The 
district court opinion devoted almost 900 words of its 
consideration of the first factor to whether Koons’ use of the 
Blanch photograph was transformative.63  Its entire consideration 
of the commercial versus non-profit distinction was to state that 
“[b]oth works were created for commercial purposes” before the 
non sequitur: “The first factor favors defendants.”64 
The Court of Appeals’ decision was not so unbalanced, but its 
discussion of the first factor immediately delved into whether 
Koons’ use of Blanch’s photograph was transformative, which, 
echoing Campbell, it termed the “heart of the fair use inquiry.”65  It 
concluded after lengthy discussion that it was indeed 
transformative because Koons used “Blanch’s image as fodder for 
his commentary on the social and aesthetic consequences of mass 
media.”66  In other words, it was satire rather than parody.67 
That Koons’ use was commercial was cursorily acknowledged 
to be relevant, though “secondary” to transformativeness and 
ultimately insignificant.68  It balanced Koons’ and his gallery’s 
                                                                                                             
61 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992). 
62 Blanch v. Koons, 396 F. Supp. 2d 476, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
63 Id. at 480–81. 
64 Id. at 481. 
65 Blanch, 467 F.3d at 251. 
66 Id. at 253. 
67 Id. at 254–55. 
68 Id. at 254. 
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economic gains not against other fair use factors but against a 
perceived public interest in the exhibition of art.69  The most telling 
sentence is this: “Notwithstanding the fact that artists are 
sometimes paid and museums sometimes earn money, the public 
exhibition of art is widely and we think properly considered to 
‘have value that benefits the broader public interest.’”70 
What explains the difference in results of the two Koons cases?  
Each of the two Koons cases dealt with only one work of art, so 
each decision was binary.  The second case was a victory for 
Koons, and much of the theory of appropriation art was accepted in 
relation to the work at issue, but it was not what such artists and 
their defenders would have hoped for, which is an acceptance that 
when an artist appropriates an element of common culture, that 
very act transforms it into a new work sufficient by itself to be fair 
use even if little other than context is physically changed. 
The most likely explanations for the difference between the 
two decisions are that: 
(1) Koons and appropriation art in general had become more 
established in the art world and seemed less outrageous in the 
sixteen years between the two opinions. 
(2) Blanch v. Koons was written by a Manhattan-based former 
first amendment lawyer (Judge Sacks) rather than the more 
personally conservative, upstate Judge Cardamone, who wrote 
Rogers v. Koons. 
(3) There was a vast quantitative difference in the extent of the 
photograph that was used and the extent of its use in Koons’ 
artwork.  In other words, the second case could have been decided 
primarily by a relatively standard application of the third statutory 
fair use factor. 
(4) In the sixteen-year interval between the two cases, the 
Supreme Court in Campbell had downgraded the significance of 
commercial use in the first factor analysis in favor of an emphasis 
                                                                                                             
69 Id. 
70 Id. (quoting Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 922 (2d Cir. 
1994)). 
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on transformative use championed in Judge Leval’s law review 
article.71 
(5) Correlated with (4) and potentially causally related, a 
substantial judicial tilt toward finding fair use.72 
All likely played a role, with the last three of greatest 
importance from the perspective of the doctrinal development of 
fair use extended in Cariou v. Prince. 
III. CARIOU V. PRINCE 
A. Facts 
Patrick Cariou spent six years living among Rastafarians in 
Jamaica developing a trusting relationship that “allowed him to 
take a series of portraits and landscape photographs” that were 
published in 2000 in a book called “Yes Rasta.”73  He described 
the photographs as “extreme classical photography and 
portraiture,” with a respectful attitude toward his subjects.74   As 
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted, “the book 
enjoyed limited commercial success.”75  The publisher printed 
7,000 copies and sold 5,791 of them.76 
Four of those sales were to well-known appropriation artist, 
Richard Prince.77  His work “has involved taking photographs and 
other images that others have produced and incorporating them 
into paintings and collages that he then presents, in a different 
context, as his own.”78  Prince tore photographs from “Yes Rasta,” 
                                                                                                             
71 See discussion supra text accompanying notes 17–34. 
72 See, e.g., discussion of Professor Netanel’s study infra text accompanying notes 
149–67. 
73 Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 698–99 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 618 
(2013). 
74 Id. at 699. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
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altered them “significantly,” and made thirty works of art in a 
collage called “Canal Zone.”79 
The district court dealt with all thirty works as a whole,80 
though, as the appellate court noted, “[t]he portions of Yes Rasta 
photographs used, and the amount of each artwork that they 
constitute, vary significantly from piece to piece.”81  In some, 
“Cariou’s work is almost entirely obscured,” showing little more 
than the Rastafarian’s hair.82  In others, “Prince did little more than 
paint blue lozenges over the subject’s eyes and mouth, and paste a 
picture of a guitar over the subject’s body.”83 
Cariou sued Prince for direct copyright infringement and the 
art gallery that sold his works and the publisher of the Canal Zone 
book for vicarious or contributory infringement.84   The two sides 
cross-moved for summary judgment, and Judge Batts of the 
Southern District of New York ruled for the plaintiff.85  The 
district judge “imposed a requirement that to qualify for a fair use 
defense, a secondary use must ‘comment on, relate to the historical 
context of, or critically refer back to the original works.’”86  Since 
Prince testified that he “do[es]n’t really have a message,” that he 
was not “trying to create anything with a new meaning or a new 
message,” and that he “do[es]n’t have any . . . interest in [Cariou’s] 
original intent,” the district court held that Prince’s “Canal Zone” 
was not transformative.87  That conclusion, plus the facts that 
Prince made commercial use of a large portion of Cariou’s 
creative photography that harmed Cariou’s ability to get a gallery 
                                                                                                             
79 Id. 
80 Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 346, 349–53, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
81 Cariou, 714 F.3d at 699–700. 
82 Id. at 700. 
83 Id. at 701.  One of the most helpful aspects of the opinion and one essential to future 
discussion of its determinations is that the Court of Appeals posted high-quality images of 
all 30 works in an Appendix available at http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/11–1197apx.htm. 
84 Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 26–37, Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011) (No. 108CV11327), 2009 WL 956547. 
85 Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 342–43. 
86 Cariou, 714 F.3d at 706 (quoting Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 348). 
87 Id. at 707. 
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to show his work, led to the conclusion that all thirty works of 
“Canal Zone” were not fair use.88 
B. The Appellate Decision 
The Second Circuit held that the district court erred in making 
the definition of parody or satire—that the new work comment on 
the copied work or at least on popular culture—a requirement of 
transformative use: 
The law imposes no requirement that a work 
comment on the original or its author in order to be 
considered transformative, and a secondary work 
may constitute a fair use even if it serves some 
purpose other than those identified in the preamble 
to the . . . [statutory section on fair use—i.e., 
(criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, 
scholarship, and research)].89 
Perhaps hedging his bet on whether commentary was required, 
while staying consistent with the tenets of appropriation art by 
disavowing any specific intent in the works, Prince’s counsel 
explained on appeal the development process of the “Canal Zone” 
works as having: 
[e]volved in part from a creative screenplay that 
Prince began writing in 2007 entitled Eden Rock, 
which is a fantastical account of survivors of a 
nuclear holocaust who create their own post-
apocalyptic society in the Caribbean.  Prince stated 
in an interview, “The rastas and the lesbians started 
starring in these pictures and were kind of like 
bands—there are, like, five people to a picture, and 
                                                                                                             
88 Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 351–54. 
89 Cariou, 714 F.3d at 706.  Judge Batts noted that transformative use was not required 
for a use to be fair but stated that “all of the precedent this Court can identify” that dealt 
with use of “raw ingredients” to create a new work, as in appropriation art, “imposes a 
requirement that the new work in some way comment on, relate to the historical context of, 
or critically refer back to the original works.” Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 348.  Her opinion 
acknowledged “some minimal transformative element intended in Prince’s use” but held 
that that factor weighed against fair use because it was “minimal at best” and varies 
inconsistently from work to work. Id. at 350. 
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every picture has a title to it.  It sort of becomes an 
allegory.”  By adding guitars depicting the 
Rastafarian’s as reggae musicians, Prince wanted to 
convey music as “the surviving, if not redeeming, 
fact of life in the post-apocalyptic world.”90 
Elsewhere, perhaps more candidly but still trying to fashion the 
explanation for using Cariou’s photographs that Prince himself 
declined to provide, the defendants’ appellate brief stated without 
reference to a “post-apocalyptic world” that: 
Prince desecrates Cariou’s reverential portraits by 
defacing them, cutting them up, and splicing them 
together with erotic nudes, electric guitars and other 
detritus of our tawdry pop culture.  The noble 
Rastafarian who occupied a pure, natural world, 
removed from contemporary culture is now 
debased, plunged into the degraded and 
commercialized space of sex, drugs and popular 
music that American culture stereotypically 
associates with Rastafarians.91 
The commingling in most of “Canal Zone” of photographs of 
naked women with Rastafarians in varying stages of alteration was 
not explained in any greater detail.92 
The appellate opinion was not concerned by that.  It held that 
what matters is not whether the artist tries “to explain and defend 
his use as transformative” or even cares about the issue, but instead 
“how the artworks may ‘reasonably be perceived.’”93  Based on its 
                                                                                                             
90 Joint Brief and Special Appendix for Defendants-Appellants at 30, Cariou v. Prince, 
784 F. Supp. 2d 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 11-1197), 2011 WL 5325288. 
91 Id. at 5. 
92 See id. 
93 Cariou, 714 F.3d at 707 (citing Brownmark Films, L.L.C. v. Comedy Partners, 682 
F.2d 687 (7th Cir. 2012), which held that a South Park episode could be held to be a 
protectable parody of an internet video on a motion to dismiss purely by the court’s 
comparison of the two videos).  The dissent claimed that Brownmark was an extreme 
case where parody was obvious and where, due to the odd procedural posture of “a 
motion to dismiss based on a non-pleaded fair use affirmative defense converted into a 
motion for summary judgment on appeal.” Cariou, 714 F.3d at 713 (Wallace, J., 
dissenting). 
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own examination as a “reasonable observer,” the appellate opinion 
held that all but five of Prince’s works were not just 
transformative, but sufficiently so to override the significance of 
factors that might otherwise have weighed against fair use.94  Two 
of the three judges on the appellate panel, at least, found the 
following objectively determined transformation: 
These twenty-five of Prince’s artworks manifest an 
entirely different aesthetic from Cariou’s 
photographs.  Where Cariou’s serene and 
deliberately composed portraits and landscape 
photographs depict the natural beauty of 
Rastafarians and their surrounding environs, 
Prince’s crude and jarring works, on the other hand, 
are hectic and provocative.  Cariou’s black-and-
white photographs were printed in a 9 1/2” x 12” 
book.  Prince has created collages on canvas that 
incorporate color, feature distorted human and other 
forms and settings, and measure between ten and 
nearly a hundred times the size of the photographs.  
Prince’s composition, presentation, scale, color 
palette, and media are fundamentally different and 
new compared to the photographs, as is the 
expressive nature of Prince’s work.95 
The opinion engaged in the requisite balancing of the four 
statutory factors, but its conclusion that the uses were 
transformative enough in twenty-five of the works inexorably led 
to the determination that all factors favoring the plaintiff did not 
matter as much and to the ultimate conclusion of fair use.96  The 
essentially commercial nature of Prince’s artwork was dismissed as 
of little significance “due to the transformative nature of the 
work.”97  So too was the fact “that Cariou’s work is creative and 
published.”98  The district court’s determination “that Prince’s 
                                                                                                             
94 Id. at 707. 
95 Id. at 706. 
96 See id. at 708–11. 
97 Id. at 708. 
98 Id. at 710. 
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‘taking was substantially greater than necessary’” was rejected as 
mistaken.99  The court cited parody cases for the principle that 
“[t]he secondary use ‘must be [permitted] to “conjure up” at least 
enough of the original’ to fulfill its transformative purpose,”100 and 
then held that the large extent of copying actually “weighs heavily 
in Prince’s favor.”101 
The fourth fair use factor—the effect of the use on the potential 
market for the original work—received more than the perfunctory 
analysis given factors two and three.  The district court had 
credited an art dealer who considered but then decided “against 
putting on a Yes Rasta show because it had already been done at 
Gagosian” gallery due to her mistaken belief that “Cariou had 
collaborated with Prince on the Gagosian show.”102  The district 
court’s analysis was held to have misunderstood the nature of the 
inquiry, which “‘is not whether the secondary use suppresses or 
even destroys the market for the original work or its potential 
derivatives, but whether the secondary use usurps the market of the 
original work.’”103 
The fourth factor was held to favor Prince because “Prince’s 
work appeals to an entirely different sort of collector than 
Cariou’s.”104  There was “nothing in the record to suggest that 
Cariou would ever develop or license secondary uses of his work 
in the vein of Prince’s artworks” or “that Prince’s artworks had any 
impact on the marketing of the photographs.”105 The Court of 
Appeals’ decision on that factor was marred by a certain whiff of 
snobbery when elaborating on the different “sort of collector” for 
Prince’s work: 
                                                                                                             
99 Id. 
100 Id. (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 588 (1994), which 
involved a parody of Roy Orbison’s Oh Pretty Woman song; and citing Leibovitz v. 
Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 114 (2d Cir. 1998), which involved a parody of 
a Vanity Fair magazine cover photo of pregnant Demi Moore). 
101 Id. at 710. 
102 Id. at 709. 
103 Id. at 708 (emphasis in original) (quoting Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 258 (2d 
Cir. 2006), and citing NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 481–82 (2d Cir. 2004)). 
104 Id. at 709. 
105 Id. 
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Certain of the Canal Zone artworks have sold for 
two million or more dollars.  The invitation list for a 
dinner that Gagosian hosted in conjunction with the 
opening of the Canal Zone show included a number of 
the wealthy and famous such as the musicians Jay-Z 
and Beyonce Knowles, artists Damien Hirst and Jeff 
Koons, professional football player Tom Brady, model 
Gisele Bundchen, Vanity Fair editor Graydon Carter, 
Vogue editor Anna Wintour, authors Jonathan Franzen 
and Candace Bushnell, and actors Robert DeNiro, 
Angelina Jolie, and Brad Pitt . . . .  Cariou on the other 
hand has not actively marketed his work or sold work 
for significant sums, and nothing in the record 
suggests that anyone will not now purchase Cariou’s 
work, or derivative non-transformative works 
(whether Cariou’s own or licensed by him) as a result 
of the market space that Prince’s work has taken up.  
This fair use factor therefore weighs in Prince’s 
favor.106 
The passage above puts in stark relief just how far the Second 
Circuit has come from its first Koons opinion that berated the 
artistic arrogance of believing that creating expensive works for 
well-heeled buyers gave the artist a free pass to copy: 
The copying was so deliberate as to suggest that 
defendants resolved so long as they were significant 
players in the art business, and the copies they 
produced bettered the price of the copied work by a 
thousand to one, their piracy of a less well-known 
artist’s work would escape being sullied by an 
accusation of plagiarism.107 
Judge Wallace, sitting by designation from the Ninth Circuit, 
dissented.108  Although he agreed with most of the majority’s legal 
analysis and, specifically, that the fair use defense did not require 
                                                                                                             
106 Id. 
107 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 303 (2d Cir. 1992). 
108 See Cariou, 714 F.3d at 712 (Wallace, J., dissenting). 
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the allegedly infringing work to comment on the original works, he 
would have remanded all thirty of Prince’s paintings to the district 
court to apply the correct legal standard upon further factual 
development.109 
The dissent also disagreed with the majority’s disregard of 
Prince’s testimony as to his intent (or lack thereof) in using 
Cariou’s work.110    Noting that he is “not an art critic or expert,” 
Judge Wallace “fail[ed] to see how the majority in its appellate 
role can ‘confidently’ draw a distinction between the twenty-five 
works that it has identified as constituting fair use and the five 
works that do not readily lend themselves to a fair use 
determination.”111 
C. Implications for the Transformative Use Test 
The opinion’s division of the Prince artworks into twenty-five 
that were fair use as a matter of law and five that were not and 
were therefore remanded will probably not make either side 
entirely happy.112  Champions of appropriation art did not get the 
complete victory that their theory of art would dictate because five 
works they would consider transformative by context were 
remanded for further analysis, but the fair use analysis will not 
give the plaintiff much cause for optimism on the works remaining 
to be decided under the correct legal standard.113  Most 
importantly, however, as the dissent complained, the opinion does 
not provide much future guidance for distinguishing among the 
works that were at issue or in deciding future cases.114  The 
                                                                                                             
109 Id. at 712–13. 
110 Id. at 713. 
111 Id. 
112 See id. at 712 (majority opinion). 
113 See id. 
114 Id. at 713 (Wallace, J., dissenting).  The split decision clearing all but five works 
may have been a subtle attempt by the appellate court to encourage settlement and tilt 
that settlement toward a fairly low amount of compensation by remanding only five 
works.  The case did indeed settle almost a year after the appellate decision.  However 
laudable the encouragement of settlement may be, it is problematic, to say the least, to 
attempt that in an appellate opinion whose language and reasoning will set the law—at 
least in the Second Circuit but also beyond—and thereby influence future unrelated 
cases. 
2014] CARIOU V. PRINCE AND FAIR USE JURISPRUDENCE 347 
 
distinctions at the extremes—where little is recognizable of 
Cariou’s photographs or where little was changed—may be 
understandable, but it may be difficult to differentiate among the 
many works in the middle where much was changed but much also 
remains intact.115 
Consider, for example, two of the works at issue: one entitled 
“Tales of Brave Ulysses,” which was determined to be fair use as a 
matter of law, and another called Graduation, which was 
remanded for determination.  “Tales of Brave Ulysses” (on the left 
below) intersperses the same unaltered Cariou photograph of a 
Rastafarian four times between naked women.  “Graduation” (on 
the right below) uses the same photograph, with Prince having 
done “little more than paint blue lozenges over the subject’s eyes 
and mouth, and paste a picture of a guitar over the subject’s 
body.”116 
 
Or compare “Back to the Garden” on the left below, which held to 
be a sufficiently transformative fair use as a matter of law, with 
“Charlie Company” on the right, which was remanded for further 
factual development.117 
 
                                                                                                             
115 See id. at 699–704, 706–08, 710–11 (majority opinion).  
116 Id. at 701. 
117 See id. at 702. 
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Why are the works on the left a more transformative use of 
Cariou’s photographs than those on the right?  When the five 
remanded are compared to the twenty-five held to be fair use, what 
seems to differentiate them is not the degree of transformativeness 
as the court defined it,118 but instead an almost quantitative 
comparison of the third fair use factor—“the amount and 
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted 
work as a whole”119—with what has been added.120  That is, it is a 
matter of looking at the proportion of the copyrighted work that 
was appropriated and the percentage of the secondary work that the 
appropriated works comprises.121  The same amount or more of 
Cariou’s photography is used in the two works to the left above as 
is in the works on the right above, but his photography comprises 
                                                                                                             
118 Id. at 706–08. 
119 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2012). 
120 Cariou, 714 F.3d at 710. 
121 See id. at 710–11. 
2014] CARIOU V. PRINCE AND FAIR USE JURISPRUDENCE 349 
 
and a far greater proportion of the works on the right.122  That 
fairly quantitative approach explains more than does the 
conceptual discussion of transformativeness and would make fair 
use law marginally more predictable, but it is not a test that the 
Second Circuit, at least, was willing to acknowledge. 
IV. THE TRANSFORMATIVE USE TEST  
IN RIGHT OF PUBLICITY CASES 
It is interesting at this point to look at how transformative 
use has spilled into another intellectual property area, the right of 
publicity, which generally prevents the commercial appropriation 
of an individual’s name or likeness.123  As we will see, however, 
its adoption in the analysis of right of publicity has been 
accompanied by different, potentially significant limitations.  
Interpreting New Jersey’s right of publicity, the Third Circuit 
recently endorsed what it referred to as the “Transformative Use 
Test,”124 borrowed from copyright law by way of the California 
Supreme Court,125 as a way “to balance the interest protected by 
the right of publicity against those interests preserved by the First 
Amendment.”126 
In Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., the plaintiff Ryan Hart was a 
Rutgers football star who sued over use of his likeness and 
biographical information in Electronic Arts’ NCAA Football series 
of video games.127  The Third Circuit used the Transformative Use 
                                                                                                             
122 See id. 
123 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652(C) (1977). 
124 Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 153 (3d Cir. 2013). 
125 Comedy III Prods. Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808, 811 (Cal. 2001) 
(holding that the sale of t-shirts and prints bearing a charcoal drawing of the Three 
Stooges violated their rights of publicity because there was no discernible 
“transformative or creative contribution” and “the marketability and economic value of 
[the work] derive[s] primarily from the fame of the celebrit[ies] depicted”).  In Winter v. 
DC Comics, the California Supreme Court rejected a right of publicity case brought by 
the rock musicians Johnny and Edgar Winter against use of their likeness in two 
“villainous half-worm, half-human” creatures in a comic book because the drawings, to 
the extent they resembled the brothers, were “distorted for purposes of lampoon, parody, 
or caricature.” Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 479 (Cal. 2003). 
126 Hart, 717 F.3d at 163. 
127 Id. at 145–47. 
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Test to conclude that the built-in ability of the game user to make 
“minor alterations” to an avatar of the football player’s “unaltered 
likeness” that “is central to the core of the game experience” was 
not sufficiently transformative for First Amendment protection of 
artistic expression to prevail over the right of publicity.128 
In a significant departure from the appropriation art copyright 
cases, the many creative things added to the game did not change 
the analysis:  “while we recognize the creative energies necessary 
for crafting the various elements of NCAA Football that are not 
tied directly to reality, we hold that they have no legal 
significance.”129  “To hold otherwise” would mean that “[a]cts of 
blatant misappropriation would count for nothing so long as the 
larger work, on balance, contained highly creative elements in 
great abundance.”130 
Limiting transformative use to a transformation of the prior 
work itself and not counting what is added—as in the Third Circuit 
right of publicity case—has the potential to limit fair use.  If that 
analysis had been used in Cariou v. Prince, then many of Prince’s 
“Canal Zone” works—certainly more than the five remanded—
would not only not have been remanded but would have been held 
not transformative as a matter of law.  As with Hart v. Elec. Arts, 
Inc.,131 Prince added much to the photos of Rastafarians, but in 
many works held to be fair use, he did not change the photos of the 
subjects,132 and in many more he did little more than add lozenges 
to their eyes and mouths and put guitars in their hands.133  Where 
that is all he did, then the artwork would not be a protected 
Transformative Use under the test applied by the Third Circuit. 
Another major point of differentiation of right of publicity 
from copyright cases is that courts have not imported other factors 
from copyright’s fair use analysis and therefore do not balance 
                                                                                                             
128 Id. at 168. 
129 Id. at 169. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 707–08, 710–11 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. 
Ct. 618 (2013). 
133 Id. at 701. 
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transformativeness against specific factors; they instead directly 
balance a celebrity’s right to commercialize his or her identity 
against a defendant’s First Amendment right to artistic 
expression.134  Given the way in which transformativeness has 
come to dominate fair use analysis in Copyright law and to render 
the other factors insignificant, the outcomes in right of publicity 
and in copyright cases might not be noticeably different or more 
predictable, but the right of publicity analysis of Hart at least 
provides greater conceptual clarity and frankness by dispensing 
with what has become mostly a charade in the copyright cases of 
considering other factors. 
V. THE ASCENDANCY OF TRANSFORMATIVENESS  
AND THE TILT TOWARDS FAIR USE 
As previously noted, the concept of transformative use began 
as a way to analyze the first statutory fair use factor: “the purpose 
and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes.”135  
The presumptive unfairness of commercial uses had a short life in 
the Supreme Court, and a more nuanced concept than commercial 
versus nonprofit was needed.136  The transformative use inquiry 
was intended to satisfy that need by asking the question thought to 
                                                                                                             
134 See Hart, 717 F.3d at 159 (“After briefly considering whether to import the ‘fair 
use’ analysis from copyright, the Comedy III court decided that only the first fair use 
factor, ‘the purpose and character of the use,’ was appropriate.” (quoting Comedy III 
Prods. Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal. 2001))); id. at 163 (“the 
Transformative Use Test maintains a singular focus on whether the work sufficiently 
transforms the celebrity’s identity or likeness”). 
135 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2012). 
136 See, e.g., Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 
1978-2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 571–72 (2008) (citing the Campbell Court’s rejection 
of the presumption raised in Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 
417, 449 (1984) that “[e]very commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively 
unfair” while it explicitly demoted commerciality as one issue among others that a court 
may consider in its analysis of the “purpose and character” of a defendant’s use.”  
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 583–84 (1994)).  To illustrate the 
point, in the first appropriation art case to come to the Second Circuit involving Jeff 
Koons two years before Campbell, the word “transformative” does not appear. See 
generally Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (1992). 
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go to the heart of the constitutional objective of Copyright law “to 
promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts”137: “whether the new 
work” does not “merely ‘supersede[s] the objects of the original 
creation’ . . . [but] instead adds something new, with a further 
purpose or different character, altering the first with new 
expression, meaning, or message.”138 
Commentators have uniformly noted the increasing influence 
of the transformativeness inquiry on fair use analysis, but with 
somewhat different views on the extent of its dominance or worth.  
It would be fair to say, however, that there is a growing recognition 
among academics and practitioners that transformativeness is 
being used for more than it can handle. 
A. The Academic Analysis 
Several academics have engaged in extensive readings of every 
fair use case they could find in a given period and published their 
conclusions.  The pioneer is Professor Beebe, who read all of the 
over-300 published federal opinions from 1978 to 2005 that made 
substantial use of the statutory four-factor fair use test.139  He 
concluded from it “that much of our conventional wisdom about 
our fair use case law . . . is wrong.”140  That “conventional 
wisdom,” he said, comes from the “anecdotal method”: “one 
essentially of connoisseurship . . . from a limited aristocracy of 
hand-picked opinions.”141 
Professor Beebe’s conclusions about transformativeness from 
large-scale reading—as opposed to reviewing a small selection of 
influential opinions that he calls connoisseurship—were somewhat 
ambivalent.  On the one hand, he concluded “that courts and 
commentators have exaggerated the influence of 
transformativeness doctrine on our fair use case law” because (a) 
                                                                                                             
137 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). 
138 Id. at 569 (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841)). 
139 See Beebe, supra note 136, at 554. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 553.  This article could, of course, be characterized as using the 
“connoisseurship” method but it is used, I would argue, for precisely the purpose it suits, 
which is to critically analyze doctrinal development. 
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“41.2% of the district court opinions following Campbell failed 
even to the refer to the doctrine . . . ;” and (b) although only 18.6% 
of appellate cases “failed to invoke the concept,” citation of the 
doctrine began a downward trend in the early 1990s.142 
Notwithstanding those reasons, there was another, more 
important reason to believe that the influence of transformativeness 
had not been exaggerated and to recognize its dominance.  
Professor Beebe found that “in those opinions in which 
transformativeness did play a role, it exerted nearly dispositive 
force not simply on the outcome of factor one143 [“the purpose and 
character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial 
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes”]144 but on the 
overall outcome of the fair use test.”145 
Professor Sag took a slightly different approach.146  He 
examined over 280 fair use cases decided in district court opinions 
from 1978 through May 31, 2011, by comparing the outcomes with 
a coding of the facts.147  His analysis “reinforce[d] the dominance 
of transformative use over other factors” in determining case 
outcomes.148 
Professor Netanel began chronologically where Professor 
Beebe left off and looked at 79 opinions from 68 fair use cases 
from 1996 through 2010.149  He came to a number of interesting 
conclusions. 
First, “the transformative use paradigm, as adopted in 
Campbell, overwhelmingly drives fair use analysis in the courts 
today.”150  Decisions since 2005 “that unequivocally characterize 
the defendant’s use as transformative almost universally find fair 
                                                                                                             
142 Id. at 604–05. 
143 Id. at 605. 
144 17 U.S.C. § 107(1). 
145 Beebe, supra note 136, at 605. 
146 See Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47 (2012). 
147 Id. at 52–53. 
148 Id. at 84. 
149 See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
715, 731 (2011). 
150 Id. at 734. 
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use.”151  The dominance is a relatively recent phenomenon, though 
the trend is not.152  Adoption of the transformativeness analysis 
“increased measurably during the period 2006-2010, even if it was 
already quite high previous to that period.153  “[Eighty-five 
percent] of district court opinions and 93.75%, or all but one, of 
appellate opinions” considered whether the challenged use was 
transformative.154  Consistent with Professor Beebe’s prior study, 
“decisions that unequivocally characterize the defendant’s use as 
transformative almost universally find fair use.”155 
Equally important, a finding of transformativeness shifts the 
analysis of the other factors so as to render them insignificant.156  
There was, for example, “a sharp decline in the weight that courts 
say they are giving to whether a use is commercial.”157  
Transformativeness does not overwhelm factors three and four so 
much as it reinterprets them toward inevitably favoring fair use.158  
The factor three issue “becomes a question not of whether the 
defendant took what is the most valuable part of the plaintiff’s 
work,” which would be the traditional way of evaluating the factor, 
“but rather whether the defendant used more than what was 
reasonable in light of the expressive purpose driving the 
transformative use.”159  As seen in Cariou v. Prince, that almost 
inevitably shifts the balance to fair use because it allows the 
potential infringer to define how much is reasonable to take.160 
It also radically reinterprets the market analysis that drives 
factor four.  It is no longer “whether the use falls within a 
conceivable licensing market for the copyright owner.”161  It 
instead “effectively delimits the legally relevant market for the 
                                                                                                             
151 Id. at 740. 
152 Id. at 734. 
153 Id. at 736. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 740. 
156 Id. at 742. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 743–46. 
159 Id. at 745. 
160 See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 708–11 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 
618 (2013). 
161 Netanel, supra note 149, at 745. 
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fourth factor.  If a use is unequivocally transformative, then, by 
definition, it causes no market harm since the copyright holder 
does not have a right to exclude others from the market for 
transformative uses.”162 
Professor Netanel found “a remarkable shift in favor of finding 
fair use in such cases at the district court level since 1995.”163  The 
success rate of defendants claiming fair use went from 22.73% 
between 1995 and 2000, to 40.91% between 2001 and 2005, to 
58.33% between 2006 and 2010.164  In other words, there was a 
close correlation between the ascendancy of the transformativeness 
analysis and decisions favoring fair use.165  The trend toward fair 
use and the close correlation of that trend with the ascendancy of 
tranformativeness can be seen in another quantitative observation: 
a “sharp increase” over the time period from 1995 to 2010 in the 
percentages of cases where judges considered transformativeness, 
where they found such a use, where defendants won upon such a 
finding, and in overall wins by defendants.166  Where there was 
also a causal connection could not be determined empirically but, 
as argued below, it is very likely.167 
Lastly, Professor Reese looked at all forty-one published 
appellate fair use opinions from the Campbell decision through 
2007.168  He noted that the transformation that mattered in fair use 
was in the purpose of the use rather than alterations to the content 
itself.169  This, of course, renders the third factor powerless to 
counteract the conclusion of transformativeness. 
B. Criticism in the Treatises 
The Goldstein treatise notes that “[i]n the years since it was 
first announced [in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose] the transformative use 
                                                                                                             
162 Id. at 744 (emphasis added). 
163 Id. at 752. 
164 See id. 
165 See id. 
166 See id. at 754–55. 
167 See id. at 751. 
168 See R. Anthony Reese, Transformativeness and the Derivative Work Right, 31 
COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 101, 105 (2008). 
169 See id. at 119. 
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doctrine has come to dominate fair use jurisprudence.  Not 
coincidentally—but not necessarily, either—the doctrine’s sweep 
has markedly tilted decision in favor of defendants.”170  Professor 
Goldstein is critical of the doctrine’s tilt toward fair use as 
“ha[ving] little support in principle, and still less in precedent.”  As 
to the former, he notes that it “threatens to undermine the balance 
that Congress struck in section 106(2)’s derivative rights provision 
to give copyright owners exclusive control over transformative 
works to the extent that these works borrow copyrightable 
expression from the copyrighted work.”171 
Noting the dominance of transformative use analysis, the 
Nimmer treatise came to the bluntly critical conclusion that many 
applications of the concept are conclusory—they appear to label a 
use “not transformative” as a shorthand for “not fair,” and 
correlatively “transformative” for “fair.”  Such a strategy empties 
the term of meaning—for the “transformative” moniker to guide, 
rather than follow, the fair use analysis, it must amount to more 
than a conclusory label.  One should perform the transformative 
inquiry on its own merits, bearing in mind that just because a given 
use qualifies as “transformative” does not even mean that 
defendants prevail under the first factor, much less that they 
prevail altogether on the fair use defense.172 
The next section will explore these two principal doctrinal 
criticisms at greater length. 
VI. THE DOCTRINAL FAILURES OF TRANSFORMATIVENESS 
A. The Dubious Distinction Between an Infringing  
Derivative Work and a Transformative Fair Use 
If creating a transformative work is considered socially and 
legally good, there is an inevitable conflict with the Copyright 
Act’s definition of an infringing derivative work as “a work based 
                                                                                                             
170 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHTS § 12.2.2 at 12:33 (3d ed. 2012 
Supp.). 
171 Id. at 12:34.1–12:35. 
172 4 NIMMER, supra note 9, § 13.05[A][1][b]. 
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upon one or more preexisting works” that includes any “form in 
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”173  
“Transformative” is the adjective form of the verb “transform,” for 
which the first two (most used) definitions are “1. To change in 
form, appearance, or structure; metamorphose.   2.  To change in 
condition, nature, or character; convert.”174 
Therein lies the problem the Goldstein treatise recognized:  If 
transformative use is a positive element of factor one weighing in 
favor of fair use, it will sweep into fair use what Congress deemed 
infringing derivative works. 
An amicus brief from the American Society of Media 
Photographers in Cariou v. Prince made that point.175  It argued 
that the only way to reconcile the problem of the related definitions 
                                                                                                             
173 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (emphasis added). 
174 RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 2420 (2 ed. 1997). Cf. 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2427 (1986): 
1a: to change completely or essentially in composition or structure: 
METAMORPOHOSE;  
b: to change the outward form or appearance of: ALTER 
c:    to change in character or condition: convert 
The Oxford American Dictionary defines transform as “make a thorough or dramatic 
change in the form, appearance, or character of.” Transform Definition, OXFORD 
AMERICAN DICTIONARY, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_ 
english/transform (last visited Nov. 20, 2013).  If so, then it is somewhat tautological to 
speak of degrees or extent of transformativeness, since any transformation is “thorough 
or dramatic.”  Trademark and statutory interpretation cases are two examples of disputes 
that often involve arguments over the meaning of words and the extent to which 
dictionaries are definitive.  They inevitably delve into theories of language and 
lexicography and debates over whether words have core meanings or, to paraphrase 
Humpty Dumpty, mean what people mean when they use the words.  Adam Liptak of 
The New York Times has provided a useful commentary on the ongoing debate 
concerning the Supreme Court’s use of dictionaries, juxtaposing legendary justices who 
did not rely on dictionaries with today’s justices, whose collection of over 120 
dictionaries seem to suggest “cherry picking.” See Adam Liptak, Justices Turning More 
Frequently to Dictionary, and Not Just for Big Words, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/14/us/14bar.html?r=0.  I prefer to avoid that debate and 
simply to make the point that the difference between the verb transform and the adjective 
transformative is, if such exists, one created by copyright lawyers, not by general usage. 
175 Brief of Amici Curiae American Society of Media Photographers, Inc. and Picture 
Archive Council of America, Inc. in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee and Affirmance, 
Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013) (No. 11-1197-cv), 2012 WL 435238 at 
*11–12. See also 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
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of “transforms” and “transformative” is for courts to interpret the 
latter in light of, and therefore arguably restricted by, the preamble 
examples of fair use in § 107; “guidance as to what sort of 
purposes will suffice to differentiate between a fair use and an 
infringing derivative work,” the brief argued, “may be found in the 
list of illustrative examples set forth in [s]ection 107, which 
includes “criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including 
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research.”176  
All have in common a “necessary and deliberate relation back to, 
and dependence on, pre-existing copyrightable works.”177 
That was a plausible way to justify the district court’s holding 
that the second work must comment on the first to be a 
transformative use, and not just parody, while prudently paying the 
necessary obeisance to transformative use analysis.178  But it was 
rejected by the Second Circuit.179   Moreover, the Supreme Court 
has already held that the preamble uses are just examples and not 
meant to limit fair use.180  Some other way to differentiate a 
derivative work from a fair use must therefore be found. 
As seen in the discussion above, what the Second Circuit 
seemed to mean by transformativeness in Blanch v. Koons and 
Cariou v. Prince was not so much that the prior work was 
changed—Blanch’s photograph and most of Cariou’s photographs 
were redacted, albeit to greatly varying extents—as that something 
else was added:  some new artistic or other expressive use 
protected by the First Amendment.181 
Elsewhere, the Second Circuit has interpreted 
transformativeness in terms of the purpose of the allegedly 
infringing work rather than on transformation of the work itself.182  
In Castle Rock Entertainment v. Carol Publishing, which held that 
                                                                                                             
176 Id. 
177 Id. at *12. 
178 Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 347–50 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
179 Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 668–69 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 618 
(2013). 
180 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985). 
181 See Cariou, 714 F.3d at 708; Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 253 (2d Cir. 2006). 
182 See Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 
1998). 
2014] CARIOU V. PRINCE AND FAIR USE JURISPRUDENCE 359 
 
a trivia book on Seinfeld episodes was not fair use, the court noted 
the “potential source of confusion in our copyright jurisprudence 
over the use of the term ‘transformative’”183 that Professor 
Goldstein criticized184 and purported to resolve that confusion by 
emphasizing the purpose of the use rather than the content.  To that 
extent, Cariou v. Prince could be seen as reintroducing the 
confusion, because there was no discernible difference (and 
certainly none explained) between the works remanded and those 
cleared as fair use. 
Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc. applied transformativeness differently 
in the context of right of publicity.185  It imposed a crucial and very 
useful limit on what could be called transformative that has been 
absent in the appropriation art cases and can return the concept to a 
more modest and appropriate role as an element of balancing 
factors: The original work itself had to be artistically changed; 
adding artistic elements around it was not transformative.186  Thus, 
Electronic Arts could not justify taking Ryan Hart’s identity by 
making him one discreet part of a complex, creative video game.187   
To give “legal significance” to the surrounding creative elements 
would mean that “[a]cts of blatant misappropriation would count 
for nothing so long as the larger work, on balance, contained 
highly creative elements in great abundance.”188  That limitation 
would have led to a very different result in the Second Circuit’s 
last two appropriation art cases. 
What also sabotages the attempt to differentiate “transforms” in 
the derivative work sense from a transformative fair use is that 
there can be much creativity in types of works that have long been 
considered and will presumably remain characterized as derivative 
works.189  Creative transformation therefore cannot be what makes 
use of a prior work legally fair.190 
                                                                                                             
183 Id. at 143. 
184 See supra text accompanying notes 170–71. 
185 See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 159–69 (3d Cir. 2013). 
186 See id. at 168–70. 
187 See id. at 169. 
188 Id. 
189 The Supreme Court has noted that “the fair use doctrine was predicated on the 
author’s implied consent to ‘reasonable and customary’ use when he released his work 
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Translation of a literary work is a prime example of use of a 
work that requires great creativity and is highly transformative, yet 
is squarely derivative.191  Literary translation is, at its best, a 
retelling of a story in a different language that requires a rare 
combination of skill and creativity to communicate meanings not 
only across languages but also across cultures.192  It does not 
supplant the market for the original because all but a few of those 
who buy and read translations are unable or unwilling to read the 
works in their original language. 
More importantly, translations employ highly creative and 
idiosyncratic uses of language.  A glimpse at the radical 
differences in language, interpretation, and meaning that different 
translations convey can be seen in comparative reviews of works 
major enough to have more than one translation.  A recent article 
on two recent translations of Dante’s Inferno, adding to the 
hundreds already done, can serve as an example.193  It compares 
the translations of an early scene when the pilgrim first realizes 
that Virgil is his guide.194  One translates the Italian into “Are you 
Virgil? Are you the spring, the well, / The fountain and the river in 
full flow / Of eloquence that sings like a seashell / Remembering 
the sea and the rainbow?”195  The review notes: “I love ‘[that] 
                                                                                                             
for public consumption.” See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 
539, 550 (1985).  What is “reasonable and customary” can, of course, change over time. 
190 See Hart, 717 F.3d at 168–70. 
191 See 4 NIMMER, supra note 9, §13.05[A][1][b]; see also Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. 
v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 1999) (creating abstracts of Japanese 
business articles and then translating them into English is “not in the least 
‘transformative’”).  Indeed, translation is listed in the Copyright Act as an example of a 
derivative work. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
192 Gabriel Garcia Marquez is said to have praised Gregory Rabassa’s English translation 
of One Hundred Years of Solitude as better than the Spanish original and to have said that 
“Rabassa read ‘One Hundred Years of Solitude,’ sat down and then rewrote it in English.”  
Andrew Bast, A Translator’s Long Journey, Page by Page, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2004, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/25/books/a-translator-s-long-journey-page-by-page.html. 
193 See Joan Acocella, What the Hell: Dante in Translation and in Dan Brown’s New 
Novel, NEW YORKER (May 27, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/books/
2013/05/27/130527crbo_books_acocella. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. 
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seashell,’ and ‘the rainbow,’” but “[n]either is in Dante.”  The 
translator was “a poet, doing a poet’s work.”196 
As this demonstrates, neither the degree of originality nor 
creativity—nor, more precisely, a judge’s assessment of such 
things—distinguishes transformed derivative works from 
transformative fair uses. 
B. The License Granted Parody to Override the Other Statutory  
Fair Use Factors Should Not Apply to the Broader Concept of 
Transformativeness 
As the Nimmer treatise recognizes, the emphasis on 
transformativeness has skewed the fair use analysis by dominating 
the first factor and making the others almost disappear.197  It does 
not, using Professor Beebe’s phrase, “stampede” the other 
factors—making other factors align with it.198  It simply renders 
them insignificant to the outcome.199  In doing so, it has 
appropriated the privileged status of parody within fair use 
jurisprudence without its justifications. 
The virtual demise of the second factor—whether the 
targeted work is primarily creative or factual—is an object lesson.  
In the seminal parody case, Campbell, the Supreme Court held that 
the fact that the copied work is creative “is not much help in this 
case, or ever likely to help much in separating the fair use sheep 
from the infringing goats in a parody case, since parodies almost 
invariably copy publicly known, expressive works.”200  Parody 
comprises a small subset of transformative uses with very special 
needs.  It generally needs to use creative works to succeed at all.  
One can certainly make fun of facts, as shown by the popularity of 
the Daily Show, but it is difficult to parody them. 
Also, as the Supreme Court noted, parody generally needs to 
conjure up more of the original (implicating the third fair use 
                                                                                                             
196 Id. 
197 4 NIMMER, supra note 9, §13.05[A][1][b]. 
198 See Beebe, supra note 136, at 588–93. 
199 See id. 
200 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994) (emphasis added). 
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factor) than other uses might because it must ensure that the 
original is fully recognizable: 
Parody’s humor, or in any event its comment, 
necessarily springs from recognizable allusion to its 
object through distorted imitation.  Its art lies in the 
tension between a known original and its parodic 
twin.  When parody takes aim at a particular 
original work, the parody must be able to “conjure 
up” at least enough of that original to make the 
object of its critical wit recognizable . . . .  What 
makes for this recognition is quotation of the 
original’s most distinctive or memorable features, 
which the parodist can be sure the audience will 
know.201 
Finally, parody has a unique entitlement not merely to harm, 
but destroy, the market for the original (neutering the fourth fair 
use factor) by holding it up to ridicule: 
[W]hen a lethal parody, like a scathing theater 
review, kills demand for the original, it does not 
produce a harm cognizable under the Copyright 
Act.  Because “parody may quite legitimately aim at 
garroting the original, destroying it commercially as 
well as artistically,” . . . the role of the courts is to 
distinguish between “[b]iting criticism [that merely] 
suppresses demand [and] copyright infringement[, 
which] usurps it.”202 
That the parodied work would almost inevitably be 
“publicly known” would tend to make the potentially “lethal 
parody” at least the result of a fair fight.203  A lethal 
transformative use of a relatively unknown work, on the other 
hand, should engender the legal equivalent of the schoolyard 
                                                                                                             
201 Id. at 588 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).  The italicized language 
shows that, as seen in Rogers v. Koons, you cannot effectively parody a relatively 
unknown work. See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992). 
202 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591–92 (quoting B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF 
COPYRIGHT 69 (1967); and Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d, 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1986)). 
203 See id. at 587, 591. 
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phrase used to shame bullies: “Pick on someone your own 
size.” 
In sum, parody uniquely needs to be able to override the 
other fair use factors to assure its existence at all.  It also has to 
victimize a well-known popular work to have the desired 
impact.204  “Pretty Woman” is an appropriate object of 
parody;205 “String of Puppies” is not.206  Putting a sculptural 
transformation of it in the “Banality Show” may be a critical 
commentary on schmaltzy culture and may be protectable as 
such, but it should require greater justification than parody. 
Parody is one subset of transformative use, however, and its 
imperatives do not necessarily apply to all transformative use.  
The Supreme Court has not expanded this characteristic of 
parody to all transformative uses, but the Second Circuit has, 
and that has led to the displacement of the statutory balancing 
in a broad swath of fair use cases.207  Moreover, the Second 
Circuit has done so without explicitly acknowledging or 
justifying the extension.208 
In Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., the 
Second Circuit noted that “the creative nature of artistic images 
typically weighs in favor of the copyright holder,” but 
“recognized . . . that the second factor may be of limited usefulness 
where the creative work of art is being used for a transformative 
purpose.”209  Its support for that was a quote from Campbell that 
was specific to parody that the Second Circuit expanded to 
transformative use in general.  It characterized Campbell as 
holding “that the second factor is not ‘likely to help much in 
separating the fair use sheep from the infringing goats’ in cases 
involving transformative copying of ‘publicly known, expressive 
                                                                                                             
204 See, e.g., id. at 588 (indicating that the “parody must be able to ‘conjure up’ at least 
enough of that original to make the object of its critical wit recognizable”). 
205 See id. at 594. 
206 See Rogers, 960 F.2d at 310. 
207 See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 208–19 and accompanying text. 
208 See supra note 207. 
209 448 F.3d 605, 612 (2d Cir. 2006). 
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works.’”210  As shown above, however, the Supreme Court did not 
say or imply that this was true generally “in cases involving 
transformative copying;” the limiting language was “in a parody 
case.”211 
Cariou v. Prince took Bill Graham Archives’s characterization 
of the Supreme Court’s holding one step further by quoting it as 
authority without any indication of its derivation from Campbell 
and its limited application to parody: the second “factor ‘may be 
of limited usefulness where,’ as here, ‘the creative work of art 
is being used for a transformative purpose.’”212 
It also expanded to transformative use as a whole Campbell’s 
recognition of the special need of parody to take more from the 
original than would be justified in other fair uses.213  As Bill 
Graham Archives did with the second factor, Cariou v. Prince 
lifted a quote from Campbell that was specific to parody and 
changed it to refer to transformative use: “[t]he secondary use 
‘must be [permitted] to “conjure up” at least enough of the 
original’ to fulfill its transformative purpose.”214  The actual quote 
from Campbell is “[w]hen parody takes aim at a particular original 
work, the parody must be able to “conjure up” at least enough of 
that original to make the object of its critical wit recognizable.”215 
It is a big leap from a parody needing to use enough of the 
“original to make the object of its critical wit recognizable”216 to 
allowing any transformative use to conjure up as much as it needs 
of an original work, especially one that is not likely or intended to 
be recognized.217  It allows the defendant’s explanation for the 
taking to justify the extent of it rather than putting the burden on 
the defendant to argue a credible justification. 
                                                                                                             
210 Id. (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586) (emphasis added). 
211 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586 (emphasis added). 
212 Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 710 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 618 
(2013) (quoting Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 612). 
213 See id. 
214 Id. (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588) (emphasis added). 
215 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588. 
216 Id. 
217 See Cariou, 714 F.3d at 710. 
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The appellate court in Cariou v. Prince held that the district 
court erred in expanding to transformative use in general the 
more specific requirement that parody comment on and ridicule 
the original.218  After correcting that legal error, the appellate 
court compounded a different legal error by expanding to 
transformative use in general the special “privilege” of parody 
to override the other fair use factors.219  What both courts 
should have held is a more nuanced concept: not that 
commenting on the original work defines what is 
transformative, but that commenting on the original justifies—
and in most cases would be required to justify—a large-scale 
taking of a prior work.  Transformative uses other than parody 
need to justify their taking at all as well as the extent of the 
taking.  Cariou v. Prince assumed away, rather than providing 
such justification.220 
This is not a specific fault of Cariou v. Prince because it 
was already part of Second Circuit fair use jurisprudence, but it 
is a fault that must be corrected to return transformativeness to 
a more appropriate, modest role in analyzing one among many 
factors rather than dominating the entire fair use analysis. 
VII. RETURNING TO A NEO-TRADITIONAL  
BALANCING APPROACH 
Judge Leval’s 1990 article noted that “[a] definite standard 
would champion predictability at the expense of justification and 
would stifle intellectual activity to the detriment of the copyright 
objectives.  We should not adopt a bright-line standard unless it 
were a good one—and we do not have a good one.”221 
As shown above, the Second Circuit has made 
transformative use the primary test of fair use and has endowed 
it with the power to override the other, potentially 
                                                                                                             
218 Id. at 706. 
219 Id. 
220 See id. 
221 Leval, supra note 1, at 1135. 
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countervailing factors.222  It has not, however, proven to be 
either a definite or bright-line standard, and its contribution to 
predictability is no more than a correlation with an increase in 
the likelihood of fair use being found.223  It has decayed into a 
buzzword—a label rather than an explanation. 
The problem is not confined to the Second Circuit, as shown 
by the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Seltzer v. Green Day, 
which involved the use of a street-art poster called “Scream 
Icon” as a backdrop for a music video for the song “East Jesus 
Nowhere” performed by Green Day.224  The fact that “the center 
of the frame is dominated by an unchanging, but modified, Scream 
Icon . . . . [t]hroughout the video” 225 would probably have been 
enough to find infringement before the judicial tilt toward fair 
use.226 
While “[t]he plethora of cases addressing this topic means 
there is no shortage of language from other courts elucidating (or 
obfuscating) the meaning of transformation,”227 it did not deter the 
Ninth Circuit from using it as the principal basis for concluding 
that the music video constituted a fair use of the prior work: 
Green Day used the original as “raw material” in 
the construction of the four-minute video backdrop.  
It is not simply a quotation or a republication; 
although Scream Icon is prominent, it remains only 
a component of what is essentially a street-art 
focused music video about religion and especially 
about Christianity (images of Jesus Christ appear—
                                                                                                             
222 See discussion supra Part VI.B. 
223 See Beebe, supra note 136, at 604–06. 
224 Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 2013). 
225 See id.  
226 See, e.g., Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 72–74, 83 (2d Cir. 
1997), where a poster of Faith Ringgold’s artwork appeared fleetingly in the background 
of a scene in a television sitcom.  Its partial visibility, not in focus, in nine sequences 
ranging from two to four seconds for a total of 27 seconds could not be determined as a 
matter of law on summary judgment to be either de minimis or fair use. 
227 Seltzer, 725 F.3d at 1176. 
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and are defaced—several times during the course of 
the video).228 
As in Cariou v. Prince and unlike Hart v. Electronic Arts, 
the Ninth Circuit seems to have accepted that adding 
surrounding material to an unaltered original work is 
transformative, even if it is not used for a different purpose.229  
The Scream Icon was considered transformative although it 
retained its function as street art in “essentially a street-art 
focused music video” and even though “the allegedly infringing 
work ma[de] few physical changes to the original [and] fail[ed] 
to comment on the original” because “new expressive content” 
was added so that it was part of a music video “about religion 
and especially about Christianity.”230 
Judges seem oblivious to the flaws and to the low level of 
esteem to which transformativeness has sunk among practitioners 
and academics.  To the extent that the judges clue into that, what 
can the courts do to return the concept to a more modest and 
appropriate role as simply one aspect of analyzing the first factor?  
We should first look at how the law’s course might reasonably be 
corrected, and then examine what that correction would look like. 
A recent article by a leading copyright practitioner, Richard 
Dannay, noted the large variety of alternatives to the four factors 
that have been proposed over the years, including Professor 
Melville Nimmer’s original suggestion that no factors be 
mentioned at all.231   Nimmer recommended that the statute’s fair 
                                                                                                             
228 Id. at 1176–77. 
229 Id. 
230 Id. 
231 See Dannay, supra note 13, at 134–42.  Dannay’s exhaustive summary was as 
follows: 
Apply fewer factors, namely, the first and forth; apply more factors, 
including anything reasonably bearing on the issue of what’s “fair” 
such as customary practices and broader social values; consult 
readers’ responses; abandon fair use and injunctions in favor of 
monetary damages for unauthorized derivative works; enhance the 
second factor’s role and importance in the fair use analysis; apply the 
fair use factors more flexibly and to the extent they respond to 
recurring categories of cases such as parody and new technologies, to 
enhance fair use predictability and uniformity; reserve fair use for 
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use provision simply read that “the fair use of a copyrighted work, 
as such phrase has heretofore been judicially defined and 
recognized, is not an infringement of copyright.”232 
A Congressional amendment to the Copyright Act is possible, 
and there has been some movement toward a comprehensive look 
at copyright law,233 but the distortion was introduced by case law 
and does not rely on any statutory language.  It would also likely 
embroil a generally ineffective Congress in a complex task. 
The preferable response to the first issue of how to correct the 
over-reliance on transformativeness lies in the possibility of the 
Supreme Court reversing course, as it did when first adopting the 
transformative use test.234  The Court’s statement in the Sony case 
that all commercial uses were presumptively unfair was clarified or 
disowned (depending on your tolerance for euphemism) ten years 
later in Campbell to make Copyright law safe for parody.235  The 
Supreme Court has not addressed fair use other than in passing 
references since then, so it has not expressed a view on whether the 
                                                                                                             
situations in which true market failure has occurred; rely on non-
binding fair use arbitration, with a de novo court determination 
available on liability but with some effect, up or down, on damages 
depending on the outcome; institute an administrative procedure (a 
Fair Use Board in the Copyright Office) to provide anticipatory, 
nonprecedential adjudications offering immunity from suit; rely on 
Supreme Court’s eBay four –factor test for a rigorous and consistent 
evaluation of the propriety of injunctive relief in fair use cases; 
develop “best practices” for categories of works such as 
documentaries, poetry, and others, to introduce greater predictability 
and reduce litigation risks. 
Id. at 141–42 (citations omitted). 
232 STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, Part 
5, 1964 REVISION BILL WITH DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS 316 (Comm. Print 1965); see 
also Dannay, supra note 13 (Dannay’s thoughtful discussion of this idea is the subject of 
the article cited). 
233 Congressman Goodlatte, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, announced in 
April 2013 that the Judiciary Committee will conduct a comprehensive review of U.S. 
copyright law. Press Release, Bob Goodlatte, Chairman, H. Judiciary Comm., Chairman 
Goodlatte Announces Comprehensive Review of Copyright Law (Apr. 24, 2013), 
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/news/2013/04242013_2.html.  It remains to be 
seen, however, what, if anything, Congress is capable of doing. 
234 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
235 See id. at 583–92. 
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expansion of parody’s arguably unique position in fair use law 
should extend to all transformative uses. 
How might the fair use standard get to the Supreme Court 
again?  To the extent that other circuits back away from the 
extreme use of transformativeness that has come to dominate 
Second Circuit decisions, that could increase the likelihood of the 
Supreme Court taking up the issue.  After all, a split in the circuits 
is considered the easiest path to a grant of certiorari.  As noted 
above, however, the Second Circuit’s view has received an uneven 
acceptance in the Third Circuit in Hart v. Electronic Arts236 and in 
the Ninth Circuit in Seltzer v. Green Day.237 
Rejection of Second Circuit cases by a sister circuit might even 
persuade the Second Circuit to reverse course, either explicitly or 
sotto voce.  The appellate court need not necessarily go en banc to 
reverse course, nor would it even have to take the odd tactic 
adopted when it reversed a mistaken view of trademark law in its 
Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc. decision.238  It could “limit” 
Cariou v. Prince “to its facts” and note that it would be the rare 
case where transformativeness alone could obliterate the statutory 
fair use factors.239 
                                                                                                             
236 Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 165–69 (3d Cir. 2013). 
237 Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1176–78 (9th Cir. 2013). 
238   In Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., the Second Circuit effectively reversed a prior 
decision in 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.Com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005), on 
what constitutes “use in commerce.”  It did so through the novel use of an Appendix to 
the opinion that states that it was read and agreed to by the prior panel in 1-800 Contacts 
as well as the unanimous panel in Rescuecom, but is “dictum and not a binding opinion of 
the Court.” Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 124, 140–41 (2d Cir. 2009).   
239 This is, to some extent, what it did with two decisions in rapid succession on de 
minimis use in copyright. See Sandoval v. New Line Cinema, 147 F.3d 215, 216 (2d. Cir. 
1998) (involving the use of ten photographic transparencies mounted on a light box in the 
background of one scene from the film “Seven.”  The longest uninterrupted view lasted 
six seconds and the total time in which the photographs appeared, not in focus and in the 
distant background, was thirty-five seconds.  The court ruled that to be de minimis.). But 
see, Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, 126 F.3d 70, 72–73 (2d Cir. 1997) (involving 
the appearance in a television sitcom of a poster of Faith Ringgold’s artwork in the 
background of a scene in a church social hall.  Its partial visibility, not in focus, in nine 
sequences, ranging from two to four seconds for a total of 27 seconds, was held not to be 
de minimis.). 
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As to the second issue, a return to a real application of the 
statutory four-factor test would require, with respect to each of the 
four factors, the following types of changes in legal analysis. 
A. First Factor 
Whether or not it was appropriate for the Supreme Court to 
retreat from the proposition that commercial uses are 
presumptively unfair, the plain language of the first factor demands 
that the commercial nature of the secondary use at least matter and 
count against a finding of fair use.240 
There is little possibility of or justification for returning to a 
bright-line rule based on distinguishing commercial from nonprofit 
uses, and the line between them can be permeable anyway, but 
Congress wanted the difference to matter and it makes sense that it 
would.  There is a difference worth noting, for example, between a 
university using a work of art to teach a course and a company 
selling t-shirts or posters of the artwork.  There is also a significant 
difference between a gallery promoting and selling a work and a 
museum displaying it—even if the museum also sells posters or t-
shirts of it. 
The idea is firmly ensconced in the law that judges should 
weigh whether allowing the secondary use encourages the useful 
arts more than calling it infringement.  Campbell held that “[t]he 
fair use doctrine . . . ‘permits [and requires] courts to avoid rigid 
application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would 
stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster.’”241  
Basing a decision on what is more likely to encourage or stifle 
creativity is, however, a perilous proposition, if not a fool’s errand, 
for at least the following reasons. 
(a) That encouraging parody will not unjustifiably deprive an 
author of his or her creative rewards is a relatively easy 
proposition, especially because a parody will generally be of a 
well-known work that has presumably already reaped rewards for 
                                                                                                             
240 See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2012). 
241 Campbell v. Acuff–Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (citations omitted) 
(second bracketed portion in original). 
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its author.  Taking it beyond parody to any transformative use 
takes the court into trickier territory in having to decide whether 
depriving the plaintiff of the right to control his work or to be 
compensated for its use will stifle future authorship. 
(b) That decision is all the more tricky since eBay eliminated 
any presumption that a finding of infringement leads inevitably to 
an injunction.242  The court no longer necessarily chooses between 
allowing and forbidding the secondary user; the secondary user can 
build on the original work by paying a royalty or other form of 
compensation.243  This raises the price of the secondary use but 
does not prohibit it or even inhibit it to anywhere near the extent 
that an injunction and impoundment order would. 
(c) Determining whether an adverse decision will deter a 
defendant from future creativity is not just more difficult but also 
requires the type of decision about what constitutes greater or 
lesser creativity that judges claim to be loath to engage in.  Being 
held an infringer did not stop Jeff Koons from producing other 
pieces of appropriation art,244 nor did it appear to hinder Richard 
Prince in creating “Canal Zone.”245  Prince said that he could have 
used stock images and, had he lost, presumably he would in the 
future.246  Whether that would be a good or bad thing for art, or 
whether the result would have been more or less creative than what 
he actually did and was sued for is a question on which reasonable 
art critics might disagree. 
(d) The standard of copyrightability is originality.247  While 
that may imply some minimal amount of creativity, judges have 
                                                                                                             
242 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006); Salinger v. 
Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 80 (2d Cir. 2010). 
243    See, e.g., Salinger, 607 F.3d at 80; Richard Dannay, Copyright Injunctions and Fair 
Use: Enter eBay—Four-Factor Fatigue or Four-Factor Freedom?, 55 J. COPYRIGHT 
SOC’Y 449, 458–59 (2008). 
244 See discussion supra Part B.2. 
245 See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 698 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 618 
(2013). 
246    See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 12, Cariou v. Prince, No. 11-1197 (2d Cir. Jan. 
25, 2012) (citing testimony). 
247 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of 
authorship.”). 
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long disclaimed any competence or authority to assess the degree 
of creativity or artistic merit in any given work.248  The two 
concepts are far from equivalent.  Determining what type of art in 
any given situation is more worthwhile and to be encouraged puts 
judges exactly where they claim they do not want to be—in the 
role of art critic rather than arbiter of legal rights.249 
B. Second Factor 
The second factor is the most easily and objectively 
determined.  Is the copied work published or unpublished, creative 
or factual?250  Nevertheless, at least where published creative 
works are at issue, it would be difficult to come up with any 
example of a case where this factor has tipped the balance against 
fair use. 
The impotence of the second factor is readily apparent in the 
appropriation art cases.  That the appropriated work was creative 
rather than factual should have weighed against fair use, but the 
Second Circuit opinions have done little more than pay lip service 
to that intuitive and statute based principle. 
In Blanch v. Koons, the appellate court disagreed with the 
district court’s conclusion that the photograph used was “‘banal 
rather than creative,’” and noted that “‘the creative nature of 
artistic images typically weighs in favor of the copyright holder,’ 
but nevertheless dismissed ‘the second factor [as having] limited 
usefulness where the creative work of art is being used for a 
transformative purpose.’”251   In Cariou v. Prince the defendant 
                                                                                                             
248 See 1 NIMMER, supra note 9, § 2.01[B] (quoting Bleistein v. Donaldson 
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903) (Holmes, J.)). 
249 Judges consistently disclaim the role of art critic, but often nevertheless assume it. 
See, e.g., Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 154 (3d Cir. 2013) (criticizing one view 
of balancing right of publicity and freedom expression as “call[ing] upon judges to act as 
both impartial jurists and discerning art critics.  These two roles cannot co-exist.”).  To 
the extent that transformativeness is seen as a proxy for artistic merit one might question 
whether judges have been or will be as reluctant to assert artistry as they claim they have 
been. 
250 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2) (2012). 
251 Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 257 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Bill Graham Archives v. 
Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 608, 612 (2d Cir. 2006)). 
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attacked the creativeness of Cariou’s photographs in the district 
court,252 but wisely abandoned that argument on appeal.  The 
Second Circuit noted that there was “no dispute that Cariou’s work 
is creative and published” but, like Blanch v. Koons, dismissed the 
importance of the second factor due to its conclusion about the 
transformative use made of it.253  The second factor’s significance 
in weighing against fair use in Rogers v. Koons cannot be assessed 
because all the factors were said to disfavor fair use.254 
The second factor should be rehabilitated to return to meaning 
and significance in the fair use determination.  Aside from parody 
and satire, creative works should receive greater protection, and 
the statutory tilting toward greater protection for creative works 
should not be so easily dismissed with the statement that it is “of 
limited usefulness where the creative work of art is being used for 
a transformative purpose.”255   The transformative purpose of the 
secondary use may outweigh the creativity of the original work 
where little of the original work is used (third factor) or it is a 
small part of the secondary work (which is part of the 
transformativeness determination), but the appropriation of a 
creative work should not be so lightly dismissed. 
C. Third Factor 
Taken alone, the third factor focuses solely on “the proportion 
of the original work used, and not how much of the secondary 
work comprises the original.”256  Balanced against the first factor, 
however, “how much of the secondary work comprises the 
original,” and, more importantly, the justification for it, can cancel 
out any significance of the third factor.257  This, as shown above, is 
                                                                                                             
252 The district court rejected Prince’s contention “that Cariou’s Photos are mere 
compilations of facts concerning Rastafarians and the Jamaican landscape, arranged with 
minimum creativity in a manner typical of their genre, and that the Photos are therefore 
not protectable as a matter of law . . . .” Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 346 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
253 Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 710 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 618 
(2013). 
254 See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 309–312 (2d Cir. 1992). 
255 Blanch, 467 F.3d at 257 (citing Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 612). 
256 Cariou, 714 F.3d at 710. 
257 Id. at 706–07. 
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primarily due to the importation of parody standards into 
transformativeness.258 
Parody does indeed need to conjure up a significant amount of 
its object to achieve its parodic purpose.259  Transformative use 
other than parody does not necessarily need to do that.  Where a 
parody is not at issue, there should generally be an inverse 
relationship between “the amount and substantiality of the portion 
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole” and the degree 
of transformation in the accused work.260 
The Second Circuit has recognized this, albeit in the language 
of transformativeness, in holding that the third factor “recognizes 
that fragmentary copying is more likely to have a transformative 
purpose than wholesale copying.”261  The decision in Cariou v. 
Prince can, to some extent, be interpreted primarily through the 
third factor.262  Many of the works held to be fair use used very 
little of Cariou’s photographs, but many of them also contained 
significant and fairly intact images from the photographs.263  An 
appropriately calibrated transformative use test would reinforce the 
significance of the third factor and make it more predictable 
because the proportion of the original work used is reasonably 
susceptible to objective determination. 
D. Fourth Factor 
The statute requires the court to consider “the effect of the use 
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”264  
That is the language of degree and a continuum: Is there likely to 
be an effect and, if so, how bad?  It has been distorted from a 
continuum to a high threshold by holding that the issue is not 
whether the secondary use affects the potential market for the 
copyrighted work—or even whether it destroys it—but whether it 
                                                                                                             
258 See id. at 710. 
259 See id. (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 588 (1994)). 
260 See 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2012). 
261 On Davis v. The Gap, 246 F.3d 152, 175 (2d Cir. 2001). 
262 See Cariou, 714 F.3d at 710. 
263 Id. at 710–11. 
264 17 U.S.C. § 107(4). 
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“usurps” it.265  Again, that is a matter of expanding Campbell’s 
limited holding about parody that it cannot, by definition, usurp the 
market for the original because there is no secondary market for 
ridicule.  The special status of parody in being allowed not just to 
affect but also to destroy the value of the original should not 
govern all fair use or even all transformative use. 
Moreover, the assumption that no one would be willing to 
license ridicule266 needs to be challenged.  Whether that is true 
should be a factual determination in the individual case rather than 
assumed, even in parody cases, but especially if it is 
transformativeness in general that is being assessed.  That not 
everyone is so lacking in a sense of humor or so averse to a 
potential licensing fee is belied by instances where artists do give 
permission for parody.  After all, Weird Al Yankovic does 
parodies only by permission of the artist mocked.267 
What has also gotten lost in the recent cases is the principle 
from Sony reiterated in Harper & Row that it is not just the harm of 
the potential use directly in front of the court that matters, but, 
more importantly, the harm if that specific practice were to become 
common. “[T]o negate fair use one need only show that if the 
                                                                                                             
265 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994) (“This distinction 
between potentially remediable displacement and unremediable disparagement is 
reflected in the rule that there is no protectible derivative market for criticism.”). 
266 See, e.g., id. (“[T]he unlikelihood that creators of imaginative works will license 
critical reviews or lampoons of their own productions removes such uses from the very 
notion of a potential licensing market.”). 
267 See FAQ, “Weird Al” Yankovic (2013), http://www.weirdal.com/faq.htm (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2014).  Weird Al Yankovic’s website has the following “FAQs”: 
Does Al get permission to do his parodies? 
Al does get permission from the original writers of the songs that he 
parodies.  While the law supports his ability to parody without 
permission, he feels it’s important to maintain the relationships that 
he’s built with artists and writers over the years.  Plus, Al wants to 
make sure that he gets his songwriter credit (as writer of new lyrics) 
as well as his rightful share of the royalties. 
What do the original artists think of the parodies? 
Most artists are genuinely flattered and consider it an honor to have 
Weird Al parody their work.  Some groups (including Nirvana) claim 
that they didn’t realize that they had really “made it” until Weird Al 
did a parody of them! 
Id. 
376 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 24:321 
 
challenged use ‘should become widespread, it would adversely 
affect the potential market for the copyrighted work.’”268  Cariou 
v. Prince failed to deal with this variant of the elementary school 
teacher’s question—“what if everyone did it?”—in analyzing the 
fourth factor; it did not take into account the damage to 
photographers not just from Prince’s specific use of Cariou’s 
photographs, but the harm if that practice within appropriation art 
and other similar types of art became prevalent.269  It may be that 
appropriation art should still win in those instances, but the choice 
and the factors involved in that choice need to be squarely faced. 
The other problem with the fourth factor is one of avoiding two 
competing circular arguments—one favoring and one disfavoring a 
fair use determination.  The pro-defendant circularity is noted by 
Professor Netanel, who pointed out that transformativeness 
“effectively delimits the legally relevant market” by defining it 
away: “If a use is unequivocally transformative, then, by 
definition, it causes no market harm since the copyright holder 
does not have a right to exclude others from the market for 
transformative uses.”270 
The pro-plaintiff circularity is discussed in the Nimmer 
treatise.271  It points out that if the potential market considered 
under the fourth factor is defined by nothing more than the manner 
in which the secondary artist used the copyrighted work, then, by 
that definition, a potential licensing opportunity has been lost.272  
“[I]t is a given in every fair use case that plaintiff suffers a loss of a 
potential market if that potential market is defined as the 
theoretical market for licensing the very use at bar.”273  The 
Second Circuit has tried to avoid this circularity by “limiting the 
universe of potential effect on [cognizable] licensing revenues  . . .  
                                                                                                             
268 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 568 (1985) (quoting 
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984)). 
269 See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 708–09 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 
618 (2013). 
270 Netanel, supra note 149, at 744. 
271 See NIMMER, supra note 9, § 13.05[A][1][d][4]. 
272 See id. 
273 Id. 
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to ‘traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed markets.’”274  
There is, of course, always room for debate over what is traditional 
or reasonable.275 
Another way in which the transformativeness analysis has 
unfairly redefined the fourth factor is shown in the Second 
Circuit’s analysis of Prince’s effect on Cariou’s market or the 
value of his photographs.276  The court’s description of the 
difference in a manner that seems fascinated by the astronomical 
prices of Prince’s artwork and the glitz of his potential customers 
defines the market by social demographic more than by similarity 
of the goods.277  It could also, in another context, have provided 
the rationale for dismissing “Canal Zone” as shamelessly 
commercial.278 
VIII. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEO-TRADITIONAL APPROACH, 
WITH ONE MODERN TWIST 
Quantitative academic studies have shown a correlation 
between the increasing dominance of the transformative use 
analysis and increasing decisions in favor of fair use.279  They have 
been cautious about reaching any conclusions about a causal 
connection,280 but the evolution of appropriation art cases, though 
not necessarily one-directional, strongly suggests that there is.  The 
doctrinal shift is not necessarily causing the shift in outcomes, or 
vice-versa.  They may also be just enabling each other. 
                                                                                                             
274 Id. (quoting American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 930 (2d Cir. 
1994)). 
275 See id. 
276 See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 708–09 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 
618 (2013). 
277 See id. 
278 Id. at 709 (“Certain of the Canal Zone artworks have sold for two million or more 
dollars.  The invitation list for a dinner that Gagosian hosted in conjunction with the opening 
of the Canal Zone show included a number of the wealthy and famous such as the musicians 
Jay-Z and Beyonce Knowles, artists Damien Hirst and Jeff Koons, professional football player 
Tom Brady, model Gisele Bundchen, Vanity Fair editor Graydon Carter, Vogue editor Anna 
Wintour, authors Jonathan Franzen and Candace Bushnell, and actors Robert DeNiro, 
Angelina Jolie, and Brad Pitt.”). 
279 See Netanel, supra note 149, at 740. 
280 See id. at 740–42; see also Beebe, supra note 136, at 597, 604–06. 
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While there are many potential explanations other than the 
ascendancy of transformativeness to explain the difference in 
results from the first to the second Koons cases—including the 
very different quantity and quality of the original photograph 
taken—it is difficult to imagine the fairly radical shift from the 
first Koons case to Cariou v. Prince without not just the 
transformative analysis, but, just as importantly, its ability to beat 
all other factors into submission. 
That they correlate means that a return to balancing the 
traditional factors is likely to lead to or correlate with a reduction 
in outcomes favoring fair use, but there is one modern doctrinal 
innovation that could go a long way toward mitigating the effect of 
reducing fair use determinations.  It is lurking in Cariou v. Prince 
and may explain what the appellate court was, sotto voce, trying to 
do when it pointed out that under the Supreme Court’s eBay 
decision, as further elaborated in Salinger v. Colting,281 the district 
court would have to reconsider whether an injunction was 
appropriate if it concluded that any of the five remanded works of 
art infringed.282 
By not declaring all the works of “Canal Zone” fair use and 
remanding five of them rather than holding them to be 
infringements as a matter of law, and in reminding the district 
court that an injunction would not necessarily follow a finding of 
infringement, the Court of Appeals was probably suggesting that 
the parties settle the remaining issue with a payment to Cariou—
                                                                                                             
281 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392–94 (2006) (relying on an 
analogy to copyright law, the Court held that there is no presumption of irreparable harm 
in patent cases and therefore no general rule that an injunction will follow from an 
adjudication of infringement).  Recognizing that prior case law presumptions that “a 
plaintiff likely to prevail on the merits of a copyright claim is also likely to suffer 
irreparable harm if an injunction does not issue” had been abrogated by eBay, Salinger v. 
Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010), held that eBay dictated that a “court must not adopt a 
‘categorical’ or ‘general’ rule or presume that the plaintiff will suffer irreparable 
harm . . . .  Instead, the court must actually consider the injury the plaintiff will suffer if 
he or she loses on the preliminary injunction but ultimately prevails on the merits, paying 
particular attention to whether the ‘remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, 
are inadequate to compensate for that injury.’” Id. at 80 (quoting eBay, 547 U.S. at 393–
94). 
282 See Cariou, 714 F.3d at 712 n.5. 
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not necessarily a large payment but something approaching what a 
reasonable royalty would have been if negotiated in the first place.  
The case did indeed settle before the district court made further 
substantive rulings.  The terms of the agreement were not, of 
course, revealed, other than that Prince and the galleries are free 
and clear of any claim by Cariou. 
And that may well be where fair use law should be going.  
Plaintiffs are not going to regain the favored status they had when 
the first Koons decision came down, which included not just a 
judgment against Koons but an order requiring him to deliver his 
remaining work to be impounded and potentially destroyed, but the 
law will also not be as pro-defendant as Cariou v. Prince would 
indicate.  Counterbalancing a more pro-plaintiff view of fair use 
that would come from closer congruence with the statute and its 
multi-factor balancing test will be a reluctance to grant injunctions 
and therefore greater focus on damages and royalty calculations.   
Like Cariou v. Prince, this direction may not make either side 
happy, but it will at least bring some of the conceptual clarity that 
fair use law has lost. 
 
